Golden Gate University Law Review
Volume 29
Issue 1 Ninth Circuit Survey

Article 6

January 1999

Constitutional Law - Colacurcio v. City of Kent
Zachary J. Dalton

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Zachary J. Dalton, Constitutional Law - Colacurcio v. City of Kent, 29 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. (1999).
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol29/iss1/6

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Golden Gate University Law Review by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
jfischer@ggu.edu.

Dalton: Constitutional Law

CASE SUMMARIES

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

COLACURCIO v. CITY OF KEN!'
163 F.3d 545 (9th Cir. 1998)

I.

INTRODUCTION

In Colacurcio v. City of Kent,! the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the City of Kent's Ordinance 3221,2 which required nude dancers to perform at least
ten feet from patrons, did not violate the First Amendment3 of
the United States Constitution. The court found that, as a
matter of law, the Kent ordinance was content-neutral and the
ten-foot distance requirement was narrowly tailored and left

1. 163 F.3d 545 (9th Cir. 1998). The appeal from the United States District
Court for the Western District of Washington was argued and submitted on April 10,
1998 before Chief Judge Hug and Circuit Judges Reinhardt and Wiggins. The decision
was fIled on December 8, 1998. Chief Judge Hug authored the opinion. Judge
Reinhardt filed a dissenting opinion.
2. "The portion of the exotic dance studio premises in which dancing and adult
entertainment by an entertainer is performed shall be a stage or platform at least
twenty-four (24) inches in elevation above the level of the patron seating areas." Kent
City Code § 5.10.110(A). "No dancing or adult entertainment by an entertainer shall
occur closer than ten (10) feet to any patron." [d., § 5.10.120(A)(3).
3. The First Amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of people peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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open ample alternative avenues for communication of protected
expression. 4
II.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Appellants Frank Colacurcio, David Ebert, and Steve Fueston desired to open a non-alcohol serving adult nightclub in the
City of Kent, Washington, featuring nude dancing on stage and
personalized table dances./l The appellants claimed that the
ten-foot rule would effectively eliminate table dancing which,
unlike nude dancing performed on a stage, requires dancers to
be in close proximity to the patrons. 6 Thus, the appellants contended that the City's ordinance violated the United States
Constitution for it amounted to a complete ban on table dancing which is a unique form of expression entitled to separate
First Amendment analysis. 7 They then filed suit in the United
States District Court for the Western District of Washington
seeking declaratory relief and damages. 8
In response, the City of Kent filed a motion for summary
judgment.9 In granting summary judgment, the district court
ruled that (1) the ordinance was a content-neutral time, place,
and manner regulation; and (2) the ten-foot distance requirement was narrowly tailored and left open ample alternative
avenues for communication of protected artistic expression. 10
The appellants appealed to the Ninth Circuit.

4. See Colacurcio v. City of Kent, 163 F.3d 545, 557 (9th Cir. 1998).
5. See id. at 548. The Kent City Council had examined the issues related to
adult entertainment for many years and, in 1995, adopted Adult Entertainment
Ordinance 3214. See id. at 548. In 1996 it amended Ordinance 3214 by adding
Ordinance 3221. Shortly thereafter, appellants filed their suit. See id. at 549.
6. See Colacurcw, 163 F.3d. at 549.
7. See id. at 548. In addition, appellants argue that table dancing is the primary
source of income for exotic dancers and the Kent ordinance would make it
uneconomical and therefore impossible for exotic dance studios to open or operate.
This would deprive dancers of their employment opportunity. See id. at 549.
8. See id. at 549.
9. See Colacurcw, 163 F.3d at 549. The United States District Court for the
Western District of Washington, Judge Thomas S. ZiIly, granted summary judgment in
November of1996. See id. at 548.
10. See id. at 549.
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THE COURT'S ANALYSIS

THE MAJORITY OPINION

Chief Judge Hug, writing for the majority, began by analyzing the level of protection traditionally reserved for nude
dancing. According to Chief Judge Hug, the fragmented nature
of the United States Supreme Court opinions dealing with
nude dancing in particular and sexually explicit but nonobscene conduct in general, resulted in a lack of clear guidance
on the level of First Amendment protection afforded to this
type of expression. 11 Likewise, scholars such as Lawrence
Tribe 12 and Erwin Chemerinsky 13 had grappled with the problem of the uncertain status of nude dancing and adult entertainment under the First Amendment.
The Ninth Circuit focused on the appellants' contention that
the district court erred in determining that the Kent ordinance
was content-neutral as a matter of law. 1. In accordance with
the United States Supreme Court opinion in Ward v. Rock
Against Racism,16 the Ninth Circuit concluded that municipalities may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, and
manner of protected speech provided that the restrictions are:
(1) content-neutral; (2) narrowly tailored to serve significant

11. See id. at 550.
12. See LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw §§ 12-18, p. 938 (2d
ed. 1988). Professor Tribe noted that uno court has yet squarely held that sexually
explicit but non-obscene speech enjoys less than full First Amendment protection." See
also Colacurcio, 163 F.3d at 550.
13. See ERWIN CHEMEmNSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 11.3.4.4. p. 836-41 (1st ed.
1997). Professor Chemerinsky views Supreme Court precedent as according sexually
explicit expression UJow value" status. See also Colacurcio, 163 F.3d at 550.
14. See Colacurcio, 163 F.3d at 550. Appellants argued that the ordinance was
content-based on its face and that the record showed that the city's predominant intent
in passing the ordinance was to ban all adult entertainment in Kent. See id. This
contention was based on statements made by the mayor and other city officials, in
addition to the City's alleged pattern of adopting restrictive ordinances in response to
proposals to build exotic dance studios. See id. at 551.
15. 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
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governmental interests; and (3) leave open ample alternative
channels of communication. 16
The court acknowledged that the ordinance would meet the
content-neutral requirement if it was aimed at controlling the
secondary effects of the banned activity or of the protected expression. 17 In addition, the Court disagreed with the appellants' claim that the purpose of the ordjnance was to suppress
speech. 18 The court concluded that because the ordinance was
aimed at controlling prostitution, drug dealing, and other
criminal activity, the Kent ordjnance was justified without reference to speech suppression. 19
The appellants also contended that the ten-foot distance
requirement was not narrowly tailored because the City could
have used less restrictive means to achieve the same result. 20
The court disagreed, however, finding that the appellants
failed to present evidence that showed that the ten-foot rule
substantially burdened more expression than necessary to
achieve its purposes. 21

16. See Colacurcio, 163 F.3d at 551 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491
U.S. 781, 791 (1989».
17. See id. at 55l. Such secondary effects include threats to public health and
safety resulting from the protected expression 88 opposed to the protected expression
itself. See id. at 55l. Contrary to appellants' contention, the court found that the Kent
ordinance was not content-based on its face because the ordinance did not distinguish
between table dancing and other exotic dance forms, nor did the ten-foot distance
requirement apply solely to table dancing. See id. at 552.
18. See Colacurcio, 163 F.3d at 552. Appellants cited various statements made by
city officials and others allegedly revealing the City's underlying speech-suppressive
purposes. For example, appellants quote the following statement from the Planning
Committee Chairman: ·With all the regulations we have adopted, I'm not too concerned
that someone's going to come and try to open something up. Because we've made it a
little bit difficult for them to make money in the traditional way they make money.n ld.
at 552. The court disagreed and noted that the ordinance was based on a
comprehensive study of adult entertainment businesses and their secondary impacts.
See id. at 553.
19. See id. at 553.
20. See id. at 553.
21. See Colacurcio, 163 F.3d at 554 (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 798-799). Chief
Judge Hug explained that a regulation of time, place, or manner must be narrowly
tailored to serve the government's legitimate content-neutral interests, but it need not
be the least restrictive means of doing so. See id. at 554. Chief Judge Hug continued:
"Rather, the requirement of narrow tailoring is satisfied 'so long as the ... regulation
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The court next addressed the appellants' argument that the
Kent ordinance failed to leave open ample alternative channels
of communication. 22 The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that
what made this case unusual was the appellants' claim that
table dancing was a unique form of protected expression that
was qualitatively different from nude stage dancing thereby
entitling it to a separate First Amendment analysis. ~ The
court held that even if table dancing was a unique form of expression, case precedent indicated that uniqueness alone was
insufficient to trigger separate First Amendment protection. 24
Further, the Ninth Circuit found the appellants' alternative
avenues of communication argument flawed because governmental interests protected by the enactment must also be
taken into account.25 The Court concluded that table dancing
in private nightclubs, an activity with documented links to
prostitution and drug dealing, was a highly unlikely candidate
for special protection under the First Amendment. 26
Next, the court addressed the appellants' argument that the
applicable "forum" for a table dance was not the whole cabaret,
but merely the area required for perl'orming the table dance. 27
The court disagreed with the appellants' attempt to extend the
public forum principle to private nightclubs. 28

promotes a substantial government interest that would be achieved less effectively
absent the regulation.'" Id. at 554 (quoting United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675,
689 (1995».
22. See Colacurcio, 163 F.3d at 555. AB established in Metromedia, Inc. v. City of
San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 525-27, (1981), the Supreme Court generally will not strike
down a governmental action for failure to leave open ample alternative channels of
communication unless the government enactment will foreclose an entire medium of
public expression across the landscape of a particular community or setting. See id. at
555. Appellants claimed Kent's ten-foot distance requirement would eliminate table
dancing altogether because an essential element is close proximity between dancers
and patrons. See id. at 555.
23. See Colacurcio, 163 F.3d. at 555.
24. See id.
25. See id.
26. See Colacurcio, 163 F.3d at 556.
27. See id.
28. See id. According to Chief Judge Hug:
Appellants' fluid definition of relevant forums, if carried to its logical
conclusion, would require courts to subdivide audiences to the extent that any
speech-restrictive regulation would necessarily fail.... The district court was
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Lastly, the court rejected the appellants' economic argument
that the income from table dances was the dancers main source
of income.29 Unconvinced by this argument, the Court stated
that "the fact that appellants hire their dancers on an independent contractor basis, refuse to pay their dancers for dancing on stage, require their dancers to pay rental fees, and limit
their dancers' remuneration to tips from patrons, appears to us
to be an effort to maximize profits while minimizing dancers'
economic security."30 Therefore, this argument failed because
the appellants did not produce economic evidence sufficient to
show that the ten-foot distance rule would result in an absolute
bar to market entry. The appellants merely established a potentialloss in profits, which arguably could be remedied by restructuring the way in which they conducted business. 31

B.

THE DISSENTING OPINION

In the dissenting opinion, Circuit Judge Reinhardt stated
that the district court erred in granting summary judgment in
favor of the City of Kent. 32 Judge Reinhardt articulated a more
narrow issue as to whether table dancing constituted a separate form of expressive communication that differentiated it
from other types of nude dancing.33 According to Judge Reinhardt, the appellants presented sufficient evidence to establish
a triable issue of fact so as to survive the City's summary
judgment motion.34

correct in rejecting this proposition. If forum analysis is relevant here, the
appropriate forum is the entire cabaret.

[d.
29. See Colacurcio, 163 F.3d at 556-557. Appellants alleged that income from
table dances is the main source of revenue for appellants' entertainters who are not
compensated for stage dances because the dancers in appellants' establishments are
independent contractors who pay rental fees to the dance studios. See id. at 556-557.
These fees are the appellants' primary source ofrevenue. See id. at 557.
30. Colacurcio, 163 F.3d at 557.
31. See id.
32. See id. at 558. (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
33. See id. at 558. Judge Reinhardt also stated that whether the message being
communicated by a table dancer was different in content from that communicated by a
nude stage dancer was an important factor for analysis. See id. at 558.
34. See Colacurcio, 163 F.3d at 558. The appellants introduced the testimony of
cultural anthropologist Judith Hanna and University of California, Santa Barb.ara
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IMPLICATIONS OF DECISION

This case illustrates the Ninth Circuit's lack of clear, constitutional guidelines regarding the level of First Amendment
protection afforded controversial activities such as nude dancing. As Chief Judge Hug noted, nude dancing is a form of expressive conduct protected, to some degree, by the First
Amendment.35 However, the court addressed the area of personalized table dancing, a socially unpopular form of expression, quite cautiously. Although this type of expression in general falls within the parameters of the First Amendment, the
Ninth Circuit was nonetheless hesitant to render a decision
that would more clearly derme the type of expressive activity
entitled to First Amendment protection.

In addition, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the United States
District Court's grant of summary judgment as a matter of law.
In so doing, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that while nude
dancing does enjoy some First Amendment protection, it is far
easier to derme what forms are not protected than to clarify
what is covered. a6

Communications Department Chair Edward Donnerstein.
Both Hanna and
Donnerstein contrasted the message sent by physical closeness with that sent by the
distance imposed by stage dancing which, Hanna testified, transmits an entirely
different signal: "coldness and impersonality." See id. at 559. According to Judge
Reinhardt:
Appellants, by producing these declarations (testimony of Judith Hanna and
Edward Donnerstein) have created a material question of fact regarding
whether table dancing is, as the district court and the msjority conclude,
merely stage dancing at a 'louder volume,' or whether it is an altogether
different form of expression that depends upon proximity, and communicates a
different and particular content.
[d. Judge Reinhardt would have reversed summary judgment because he believed the
factual issues created by the appellants' expert testimony raised questions for a jury.
See id. at 559.
35. See Colacurcio, 163 F.3d at 549-550.
36. This approach is similar in content to the view expressed by Justice Potter
Stewart in his concurring opinion in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1963).
Justice Stewart, in concluding that criminal obscenity laws were constitutionally
limited under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to hard-core pornography, stated:
I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand
to be embraced within that shorthand description (hard-core pornography);
and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when
I see it, and the motion picture involved in this case is not that.
Jacobellis, 378 U.S. at 197.
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Despite a lack of established guidelines, the Ninth Circuit's
holding is consistent with other appellate court decisions on the
constitutionality of municipally imposed distance requirements
between nude dancers and patrons. The United States Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit encountered a similar issue
when the validity of a Chattanooga, Tennessee ordinance requiring a six-foot buffer zone between nude dancers and patrons was challenged.37 While the Sixth Circuit analyzed the
buffer zone issue differently than the Ninth Circuit,38 it nonetheless arrived at a similar conclusion: a municipally imposed
distance requirement between nude dancers and patrons is
constitutional so long as it furthers sufficient governmental
objectives such as the prevention of prostitution, drug dealing,
and disease. 39
Zachary J. Dalton *

37. See DLS, Inc. v. City of Chattanooga, 107 F.3d 403 (6th Cir. 1997). In DLS,
owners and employees of an adult cabaret challenged a city ordinance that regulated
adult-oriented establishments. Although the DLS court addressed a variety of issues, a
large portion of the opinion concerned the constitutionality of Chattanooga City Code §
11-435 (d). See id. at 406. This statute required all performances to occur at least six
feet from the nearest entertainer, employee, and/or customer. See id. The Sixth
Circuit held that the ordinance provision prohibiting performers from approaching
within six feet of customers did not violate the First Amendment. See id. at 413.
38. See DLS, 107 F.3d at 409. The Sixth Circuit recognized that erotic dancing is
not necessarily "expressive activity," as a matter of law, for First Amendment
purposes. Rather, the message communicated by nude dancing was "an endorsement
of erotic experience" as opposed to speech. See id. at 409. In this regard, DLS differed
from Colacurcio, where appellants provided evidence to qualify nude table dancing as
an expressive form of communication because of it's message.
39. See DLS, 107 F.3d at 410. The Sixth Circuit held that appellants were
incorrect in claiming that the six-foot distance rule failed to further governmental
interests. The Sixth Circuit found that the requirement of a six-foot buffer zone
furthered the important state interests of the prevention of crime and the prevention of
disease. See id. at 410-411.
* Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 2000.
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